Revision of a judgment of the Federal Tribunal annulling an award

4F_8/20131

 

Judgment of December 10, 2013

 

 

First Civil Law Court

 

 

Federal Judge Klett (Mrs.), Presiding

Federal Judge Kolly

Federal Judge Hohl (Mrs.)

Federal Judge Kiss (Mrs.)

Federal Judge Niquille (Mrs.)

Clerk of the Court: M. Carruzzo

 

 

Y.________ Ltd.

Represented by Mr. Ivo Hungerbühler, Mr. Lukas Wyss, and Mr. Alexander Blarer, 

Petitioner

 

v.

 

X.________ Ltd.

Represented by Mr. Oliver Ciric,

Respondent

 

 

Facts:

 

A.

In a judgment of April 17, 2013, in Case 4A_669/2012, the First Civil Law Court of the Federal Tribunal partially upheld the appeal made by X.________ Ltd. and annulled the final award and the addendum issued by a sole arbitrator in that case on October 6, and November 14, 2012. The costs, set at CHF 17’000, were to be paid by each party in half and no further costs awarded.

 

The pertinent factual and procedural circumstances of the case were summarized as follows in the chapter entitled “Facts” of that judgment:

 

“Facts:

 

A.

On July 1, 2010, X.________ Limited (hereafter: X.________), a company under English law based in London, entered into a preliminary agreement with V.________, a company controlled by A.__________, with a view to selling it various nickel products. The agreement was entered into as a letter, written on the letterhead of X._________ and signed by B.________, the executive director of that company, as well as by A.________ (hereafter: the V.________ letter).

 

On October 27, 2010, X.________ and V.________ entered into a tripartite agreement entitled the Framework Agreement (hereafter: The Framework Agreement) with Y.________ Limited (hereafter: Y.________), a company under Swiss law domiciled at [name of city omitted] and created for this purpose by B.________, C.________ and D.________. The principal purpose of this Framework Agreement was to transfer to Y.________ all of the rights granted to V.________ in the V.________ letter, thus making the Swiss company a co-contractor of X.________ for the sale of the latter’s products. The Framework Agreement anticipated an allocation of 2’400 metric tons of nickel over a year from October 2010 and the delivery of the products to Hull (England) where they would be stored in a consignment site “call-off stock”2 reserved for Y.________. The latter was granted the right to sell the consignment stock and to take the products from the consignment site. As consideration it undertook to pay the purchase price of the goods to X.________ the day after their removal. Governed by English law, the Framework Agreement contained an arbitration clause stating that any dispute arising from it would be submitted to a sole arbitrator, with the seat of the arbitration in Zurich.

 

At the same time, A.________ and Y.________ entered into a partnership agreement for the resale of the products of X.________ in the United Kingdom.

 

The Framework Agreement was never performed. Y.________ and X.________ both reject responsibility for the failure.

 

B.

In a request of September 6, 2011, Y.________ initiated arbitration proceedings against X.________ with a view to obtaining the payment of the total amount of USD 2’320’919.54. In doing so it principally sought compensation for the profit lost as a consequence of the failure to supply nickel over 12 months (October 2010 to September 2011). In this respect it claimed an amount of USD 2’520’000 corresponding to the unit price of USD 1’050 per metric ton, at which price it would allegedly have resold the goods, multiplied by the quantity anticipated in the Framework Agreement (2’400 metric tons). From this amount it deduced the purchase price of the goods, which it set at USD 30 per metric ton by reference to the figure in one of the clauses of the V.________ letter, namely a total of USD 72’000 (30 x 2’400), the financial costs of USD 54’084.46, as well as the credit insurance premium, namely USD 105’753. The result was a net loss of profit of USD 2’288’162.54, to which an amount of USD 32’757 was added for legal costs concerning the negotiation and the conclusion of the Framework Agreement. The total thus obtained is equal to the aforesaid global amount of the claim.

 

In its answer of October 14, 2011, X.________ opposed the request. Essentially it argued that the Framework Agreement was merely a statement of intent with no binding force, with a view to the subsequent conclusion of a contract (an “agreement to agree”3). As to damages, the Defendant argued that the Claimant had grossly overstated the amount for various reasons.

 

On November 17, 2011, the Zurich Chamber of Commerce appointed a London lawyer as the sole Arbitrator. The parties exchanged briefs. A hearing was held in London from June 20 to June 22, 2012.

 

In a final award of October 6, 2012, the Arbitrator ordered X.________ to pay Y.________ the amount of USD 1’800’000 in lost profit, registration costs, and half his fees (see the dispositive part of the award at no. 114). In substance, he found that the Framework Agreement was a real contract binding the Parties. As to the lost profit, he set it at USD 750 per metric ton, multiplied by 2’400 units. However he did not take into account the legal costs sought by Y.________.

 

Upon request from Y.________ the Arbitrator issued an Amendment to the Award of 6th November [sic]4 2012 on November 14, 2012, limited to the issue of the costs of the parties. Indeed, while he had set an amount in this respect in the award (see award nos. 110-112) he had omitted to formally include this in the “operative part” of the award. He did so by adding a paragraph, no. 115, in which he ordered X.________ to pay Y.________ the amount he set as that party’s costs.

 

C.

On November 12, 2012, X.________ (hereafter: the Appellant) filed a civil law appeal. Arguing that the Arbitrator violated its right to be heard, it asks the Federal Tribunal to annul the final award. Moreover it requires that the names of the parties be anonymized in the judgment published on the internet and in the Official Reporter, as the case may be.

 

In its answer of February 8, 2013, Y.________ submits that the appeal should be rejected. The Arbitrator did not file an answer.

 

In a letter of February 26, 2013, counsel for the Appellant advised the Federal Tribunal that his client maintained its submissions after taking note of its opponent’s answer.”

 

The following passages of the judgment at issue must be quoted to decide the request for revision submitted to this Court:

 

“Reasons:

 

1.

According to Art. 54(1) LTF,5 the Federal Tribunal issues its decision in an official language,6 as a rule in the language of the decision under appeal. When the decision was issued in another language (in this case English), the Federal Tribunal uses the official language chosen by the parties. In the arbitration they used English and in the briefs submitted to the Federal Tribunal both used French. According to its practice, the Federal Tribunal shall consequently issue its judgment in French.

 

2.

In the field of international arbitration a civil law appeal is allowed against the decisions of arbitral tribunals pursuant to the requirements of Art. 190 to 192 PILA7 (Art. 77(1) LTF).

 

2.1

The seat of the arbitration was set in Zurich. At least one of the parties (in this case, the Appellant) did not have its domicile in Switzerland at the decisive time. The provisions of chapter 12 PILA are accordingly applicable (Art. 176(1) PILA).

 

2.2

The Appellant is directly affected by the award under appeal as the Arbitrator ordered it to pay the Respondent a sum of money much too high in its view. Accordingly it has an interest worthy of protection in the annulment of the award, which gives it standing to appeal (Art. 76(1) LTF).

 

Filed within 30 days after the notification of the final award (Art. 100(1) LTF in connection with Art. 45(1) LTF) the appeal meets the formal requirements at Art. 42(1) LTF and is consequently admissible.

 

 

 

 

2.3

The Appellant’s submission that the name of the parties should be anonymized in this judgment has no independent bearing since this judgment will be published in an anonymous format in accordance with Art. 27(2) LTF and the practice of the Federal Tribunal.

 

3.

Relying upon Art 190(2)(d) PILA, the Appellant argues that the Arbitrator violated its right to be heard.

 

3.1

The right to be heard in contradictory proceedings within the meaning of Art. 190(2)(d) PILA does not require an international arbitral award to be reasoned (ATF 134 III 1868 at 6.1 and references). However it imposes upon the Arbitrators a minimal duty to examine and address the pertinent issues (ATF 133 III 235 at 5.2 p. 248 and the cases quoted). This duty is violated when, inadvertently or by misunderstanding, the arbitral tribunal does not take into account some statements of facts, arguments, evidence and offers of evidence submitted by one of the parties and important to the decision to be issued. If the award totally overlooks some items apparently important to the outcome of the case, it behooves the arbitrators or the Respondent to justify the omission in their answer to the appeal. They must show that contrary to the Appellant’s arguments, the items omitted were not pertinent to decide the case at hand or, if they were, that they were implicitly refuted by the arbitral tribunal. However the arbitrators are not obliged to discuss all arguments raised by the parties, so that they cannot be found to have violated the right to be heard in contradictory proceedings for not refuting, albeit implicitly, an argument objectively devoid of any pertinence (ATF 133 III 235 at 5.2 and the cases quoted).

 

Moreover, the Federal Tribunal has held that it does not behoove this Court to decide whether the arbitrators should have upheld or rejected the argument they overlooked, if they had dealt with it. This would indeed disregard the formal nature of the right to be heard and the requirement that, in case of violation of this right, the decision under appeal should be annulled irrespective of the Appellant’s chances to obtain a different result (judgment 4A_360/20119 of January 31, 2012, at 5.1 last paragraph and the precedent quoted).

 

3.2

The Appellant no longer challenges the binding nature of the Framework Agreement of October 27, 2010. However it challenges the way in which the Arbitrator computed the damages claimed by the Respondent for breach of the aforesaid agreement by its contractual counterpart. According to the Appellant, the Arbitrator did not address four arguments it had submitted in its briefs in this respect, in particular in its Skeleton Argument10 of June 15, 2012. Each of these arguments must be reviewed in light of the aforesaid case law and the remarks submitted by the Respondent, while the Arbitrator did not submit an answer. It must be pointed out beforehand that, despite the award being silent as to this issue, it is not disputed that the Respondent – which seeks positive damages from the Appellant and more precisely compensation for its lucrum cessans – can only obtain, in this respect, an amount corresponding to its net lost profit, namely the difference between the price at which it could have resold the nickel products which were the object of the Framework Agreement and all the costs it would have paid to acquire these products (as to the general principle concerning how to compute damages, see for instance judgment 4A_288/2008 of September 4, 2008, at 2.1 and the cases quoted). Moreover it is not demonstrated or even claimed that English law, which governs the contract, would have another approach to the concept of lost profit.

 

3.2.1

The first and principal argument concerns the price that the Respondent should have paid to the Appellant for the acquisition of nickel products (appeal nos. 59-64 and nos. 98-105).

 

The Appellant sets forth, with references, that on the basis of an expert report from a Mr. E.________, it stated in detail all of the elements constituting the price that the Respondent should have paid for acquiring the products at issue. According to the Appellant, the clear text of the V.________ letter shows that the unit price of USD 30 (premium) per metric ton concerned uncut nickel cathodes deliverable in Rotterdam (Netherlands) while the Respondent intended to obtain the delivery of cut nickel cathodes at the consignment site set in Hull. The costs to cut (4 x 4) the cathodes and the transportation costs (including insurance) between these two cities amounted to USD 150 and USD 91 per metric ton respectively, according to the expert, and they were due on top of the unit price pursuant to the V.________ letter. Moreover the financial costs, estimated at USD 83 per metric ton, should also be included. The result was a total deduction of USD 354 (30 + 150 + 91 + 83) per metric ton from the unit resale price of the cathodes (USD 525 according to the Appellant; see appeal Nr 62 p.22); hence a net lost profit of USD 171 per metric ton. According to the Appellant, the Arbitrator totally overlooked this argument, merely taking into consideration the basic price of USD 30 per metric ton.

 

It must be found that the Appellant is right. Indeed it appears from the award under appeal that while specifically mentioning the deductions proposed by expert E.________ (n. 101) and by the Appellant in agreement with him, the Arbitrator totally overlooks them, without giving the least explanation in this respect.

 

The Respondent objects that this results from the Arbitrator reasoning on the basis of net prices while it had argued on the basis of gross prices. In its view, when taking as a basis for computation the gross unit price of USD 1’050, at which it anticipated to resale the cathodes (see B above) and deducting from this amount the purchase price (USD 30), the cutting costs (USD 150), and the delivery costs of the cathodes (USD 91 from Rotterdam and USD 23 from Hull), i.e. a total of USD 294, one obtains a net lost profit of USD 756 per metric ton, which is equal to what the Arbitrator held but for a few dollars (750 USD; answer at V). This argument is unconvincing. From a mathematical point of view, it does not rely on the same figures as the Appellant’s as the latter intends to charge USD 354 per metric ton (instead of USD 294) in respect of the acquisition costs of the cathodes, which would reduce the net lost profit to USD 696 (1’050 – 354) instead of the USD 756 computed by the Respondent. Furthermore and above all, it does not appear from a reading of the award that its author reasoned on the basis of net prices. At least, the Respondent does not demonstrate this and its mere reference to the word “margin” used by the Arbitrator at Nr 104 and 107 of the award is completely insufficient in this respect. In reality, as he explains in the pertinent section of the award (Nr 108), the Arbitrator held the figure of USD 750 per metric ton because it was a conservative assumption11 issued by B.________, the Respondent’s executive director. In this respect he referred to paragraph 14 and 15 of the witness statement of one of the Appellant’s founders B.________ (ibid). Yet in the excerpt quoted the latter merely reports the indications given by B.________ and A.________ as to the price that some third parties were ready to pay to acquire the Appellant’s nickel products (award Nr 104), namely as to the price that the Respondent could hope to obtain when reselling the products. Consequently nothing in the text of the award under appeal supports the Respondent’s argument. To the contrary it appears that the Arbitrator, on the basis of his free assessment of the evidence, considered that the USD 1’050 charged by the Respondent as a possible resale price of the nickel cathodes was overrated, which is why he reduced it to USD 750. However the problem of the allocation of the acquisition costs of the products does not appear to have caught his attention. At least he did not give any explanation from which the reason for which he overlooked the issue could be asserted. In conclusion the Appellant is right to argue a violation of its right to be heard in this respect.

 

[…]

 

3.2.5

In the computation it proposes at no. 62, p. 22 of its appeal brief, the Appellant charges the amount of USD 525 per metric ton, which allegedly represents the gross amount at which the Respondent could have resold the nickel cathodes to its clients. However the Arbitrator held an amount of USD 750 in this respect. As the Appellant does not argue a violation of its right to be heard as to this issue, it seeks in vain to substitute the latter amount with the former.

 

3.3

In conclusion, the appeal must be granted in part as to a violation of Art. 190(2)(d) PILA to the extent that it concerns the computation of the price that the Respondent should have paid to the Appellant for the nickel products (above 3.2.1) and rejected as to the other issues (above 3.2.2 to 3.2.5).    

 

[…]

 

B.

On June 3, 2013, Y.________ filed a request seeking revision of the aforesaid judgment. It submits that the judgment should be annulled and the civil law appeal filed by X.________ on November 12, 2013, against the October 6, 2012, award should be rejected.

 

In its answer of July 29, 2013, X.________ submits that the Federal Tribunal should reject the request for revision.

 

While invited by the presiding judge on October 18, 2013, to state his views as to the request for revision by November 18, 2013, if he wished to do so, the sole arbitrator did not respond.

 

 

Reasons:

 

1.

 

1.1.

The revision of a judgment of the Federal Tribunal may be sought for one of the grounds stated at Art. 121 to 123 LTF12. The request for revision must be submitted within the specific time limit that Art. 124(1) LTF sets, depending upon the ground invoked. Its admissibility is subject to the existence of a legal interest worthy of protection. The petitioner must have a specific and present interest in the modification of the decision, the revision of which is sought (judgment 4F_15/2008 of November 20, 2013, at 1.1 and the precedent quoted).

 

1.2.

In the case at hand, Y.________ invokes the ground for revision at Art. 121(d) LTF. As it argues that one of the other rules of procedures contemplated by Art. 124(1)(b) LTF was violated, it had to submit its ad hoc request within 30 days of the notification of the judgment of April 17, 2013, by the First Civil Law Court in case 4A_669/2012. Having received the judgment on May 3, 2013, it acted in a timely manner by submitting the request for revision to a post office on June 3, 2013, the previous day being a Sunday (Art. 45(1) LTF). Y.________ did not entirely prevail in the appeal proceedings in dispute as it opposed, without success, the partial upholding of the appeal made by X.________ against the final award of October 6, 2012. Accordingly, it has a specific and present interest in obtaining the annulment of the federal judgment.

 

The request for revision submitted to this Court is accordingly admissible.

 

2.

 

2.1.

Pursuant to Art. 121(d) LTF, the revision of a judgment of the Federal Tribunal may be sought when the Tribunal inadvertently did not take some pertinent facts from the file into consideration. This ground for revision refers to a case in which the Federal Tribunal decided on the basis of facts that are incomplete or different from those resulting from the file. The oversight implies an error and consists of either disregarding or distorting a fact or an exhibit. It must relate to the very content of the fact and its perception by the Tribunal – but not to the legal assessment of the fact. The facts must be apparent from the file. Moreover, the oversight must concern a fact likely to result in a different decision, more favorable to the petitioner (judgment 4F_4/2012 of June 6, 2013, at 1 and the cases quoted).

 

2.2.

2.2.1.

In support of its request for revision, Y.________ criticizes the Federal Tribunal for confusing price and premium. It argues that the First Civil Law Court overlooked that the price of nickel, quoted at the London Metal Exchange (LME) was above USD 20’000 per metric ton at the decisive time. Instead of using this official LME price, which the V.________ letter declared applicable as to the heading “price basis,” the federal judges took into account the amount of USD 30 per metric ton as the purchase price of the nickel acquired from X.________, which really represented the premium to pay to the seller. Accordingly, under the influence of the erroneous explanations given in the appeal brief, they did not understand that the USD 750 mentioned in the arbitral award (n. 108) did not correspond to the gross amount which Y.________ could have resold the nickel cathodes to its clients but to the margin per metric ton resulting from this operation, namely to the net loss of profit consisting of the difference between the resale price of one metric ton of nickel and all the costs paid to acquire this quantity of the metal at issue.

 

According to Y.________, the 750 USD per metric ton awarded by the arbitrator as loss of profit represents less than 3.75% of the historical rate of nickel during the time period involved. In its view, this is clear evidence that the arbitrator did not fail to take into account the acquisition costs. Moreover, X.________ admitted as much by stating at n. 31 of its answer to the request for revision that, “with a view to obtaining the amount of the net lost profits, the Arbitral Tribunal calculated the costs that Y.________ would still incur by (sic) the acquisition of nickel products to be sold to its clients.”

 

Consequently, according to Y.________, the Federal Tribunal attempted in vain to understand why the issue of the allocation of the acquisition costs of the nickel cathodes had not caught the arbitrator’s attention. In its view, what X.________ ultimately criticizes is the fact that the arbitrator did not allocate certain acquisition costs claimed by Y.________ when he calculated the petitioner’s lost profit. However, this is a mere matter of assessment of the evidence which the Federal Tribunal could not review due to the limited scope this Court has in an appeal against an international arbitral award.

 

Therefore, according to Y.________, assuming the First Civil Law Court had avoided the oversight alleged in the request for revision, it could have rejected the argument based on a violation of the right to be heard as it did for the other arguments submitted in the appeal of X.________. Accordingly, the Federal Tribunal should annul the judgment issued in case 4A_669/2012 on April 17, 2013, and issue a new decision rejecting the appeal with costs.

 

2.2.2. The summary of the argument – which, incidentally, is essentially an appellate one – shows that under the cloak of an allegation of oversight by the First Civil Law Court, Y.________ really seeks to call into question the legal solution upheld in the judgment of April 17, 2013, as to one of the four arguments of violation of the right to be heard, within the meaning of Art 190(2)(d) PILA,13 which X.________ had raised in its civil law appeal against the award of October 6, 2012. Yet, this is not the subject of a procedure for revision of a judgment of the Federal Tribunal pursuant to Art. 121 ff LTF.

 

Today, Y.________ made much of the historic rate of nickel on the LME, which is common knowledge. This claim already appears questionable from the definition of notoriety given by case law (ATF 135 III 88 at 4.1 and the references). Be this as it may, it is striking that in the appellate brief of X.________ and the answer of Y.________ in the file of case 4A_669/2012, there is no mention of the rate higher than USD 20’000 per metric ton at which this metal was sold at the decisive time. Thus, it is inappropriate for Y.________ to criticize the Federal Tribunal for not taking this element into account. Actually, there is no doubt that the real value of nickel was not decisive for the calculation of the lost profit in the case at hand because in the niche market contemplated by Y.________, the former paid X.________ for the goods the day after withdrawing them from the storage site to deliver them to the purchaser, so that it was unlikely that the value would change significantly during the short time required for the buy/sell of the nickel conducted in this manner. Moreover, in reading the various writings of the parties, it is notable that they focused their attention on the issue of the difference between the amount that Y.________ could claim from its clients above the base price and the global amount that it would pay out, also above the base price, to acquire the nickel meant to be resold. In the arbitral proceedings, the English words premium or surcharge were used to qualify these amounts (see award of October 6, 2012, p. 51 n. 106, 2nd §). Following X.________, the First Civil Law Court translated these terms into French as prix (purchase price; respectively, acquisition cost and resale price) in the judgment in dispute, while Y.________ used the (French) word premium. However, this is only an issue of terminology, even if one has to grant to the Petitioner that the word ‘premium’ may better express the concept involved than the word ‘price’ used in the judgment. Yet the issue was to determine which premium or which supplement Y.________ could anticipate invoicing its clients for on the one hand and the entire cost it would have incurred for the purchase of the nickel from X.________ on the other hand, in order to calculate its net lost profit. The dispute revolved around these issues: as to the first, Y._________ estimated USD 1’050 as the average gross premium it would have received per metric ton of nickel resold to its clients, while according to X.________, its counterpart could have hoped to receive only USD 525 on that account; as to the second, X.________ considered that Y.________ should have allocated to the latter amount for each metric ton not only the USD 30 premium agreed between the parties, but also USD 324, irrespective of the commission to be paid to A.________, for the transportation costs (USD 91), the cutting costs (USD 150) and the financial costs (USD 83), thus a total of USD 354, while Y.________ intended to deduct a maximum of USD 82.95 from the unit resale premium in connection with the agreed-upon premium and the financial costs (i.e., USD 2’520’000-USD 2’320’919.54: 2400 metric tons; see n. 92 of the Statement of claim of February 2, 2012, submitted by Y.________ as Exhibit 8 to its request for revision).

 

In the passages of the judgment in dispute quoted above, to which reference shall be made here, the First Civil Law Court clearly set forth the issues at hand and indicated the reasons for which, in view of the text of the award, X.________ could legitimately argue that the arbitrator had not taken into consideration the arguments it had submitted as to how to calculate the net loss of profit undergone by Y.________. It did so without its reasoning being perverted by any manifest oversight within the meaning of the aforesaid case law. Moreover, it recalled the formal nature of the right to be heard and implicitly did not exclude that the arbitrator could reach the same solution as in the award of October 6, 2012, when he decides the matter again. One cannot but regret that the arbitrator did not take the trouble to express his view as to the appeal against his award and the request for revision, which doubtlessly would have clarified the situation.

 

Be this as it may, the request for revision submitted to this Court must be rejected.

 

3.

In view of the outcome of the request for revision, Y.________ must pay the judicial costs (Art. 66(1) LTF)  and compensate X.________ (Art. 68(1) and (2) LTF).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Therefore the Federal Tribunal pronounces:

 

1.

The request for revision is rejected.

 

2.

The judicial costs set at CHF 17’000 shall be borne by the Petitioner.

 

3.

The Petitioner shall pay to the Respondent an amount of CHF 19’000 for the federal judicial proceedings.

 

4.

This judgment shall be notified to the representatives of the parties and to the sole arbitrator.

 

 

 

Lausanne, December 10, 2013

 

 

In the name of the First Civil Law Court of the Swiss Federal Tribunal

 

 

 

Presiding Judge:                                              Clerk:

 

Klett (Mrs.)                                                       Carruzzo

• 1. Translator’s Note: Quote as Y.________ Ltd. v. X.________ Ltd., 4F_8/2013. The original decision is in French.
• 2. Translator’s note: In English in the original text.
• 3. Translator’s note: In English in the original text.
• 4. Translator’s note: In English in the original text.
• 5. Translator’s note: LTF is the French abbreviation for the Federal Statute of June 17, 2005, organizing the Federal Tribunal, RS 173.110.
• 6. Translator’s note: The official languages of Switzerland are German, French, and Italian.
• 7. Translator’s note: PILA is the most commonly used English abbreviation for the Federal Statute on International Private Law of December 18, 1987, RS 291.
• 8.   Translator’s note: The English translation of this decision is available here:  http://www.swissarbitrationdecisions.com/right-to-be-heard-equality-betw...
• 9.   Translator’s note: The English translation of this decision is available here: http://www.swissarbitrationdecisions.com/icc-award-annulled-for-breach-o...
• 10. Translator’s note: In English in the original text
• 11. Translator’s note: In English in the original text.
• 12. Translator’s Note: LTF is the French abbreviation of the Federal Statute of June 17, 2005, organizing the Federal Tribunal, RS 173.110.
• 13. Translator’s Note: PILA is the most commonly used English abbreviation for the Federal Statute on International Private Law of December 18, 1987, RS 291.